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1.Materialism, brains and discontinuity 
 
 Günther Mensching once observed that materialism is a “discontinuous tradition,”1 which does 
not proceed by a transmission of doctrines, modified from generation to generation. Rather, each 
period founds a form of materialism on new bases, from theology onto natural history and 
emergent biology in the Enlightenment, biochemistry in the nineteenth century, physics in the 
mid-twentieth century and neuroscience ever since. Additionally, the ontological status of the 
brain is recognized in the eighteenth century as a key challenge in articulating a form of 
materialism. I shall focus on this problematic status of the brain as a starting-point for 
materialists, notably Denis Diderot in the eighteenth century and the twentieth-century 
proponents of the ‘identity theory’ of brain and mind (hereafter IT). Here, the discontinuity is not 
due to changing intellectual or socio-cultural contexts (“it is possible to attend to contexts and to 
brains at once”2) but rather to differing attitudes towards the brain, which themselves imply 
differing conceptions of science, materialism and culture.
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Materialism has no essence or suprahistorical definition, as it reflects particular 
intellectual constellations (thereby rendering any “history of materialism,” like Lange’s, 
untenable
4
), but most generally, it is the view that everything that is real is material, or is the 
product of material processes. More precisely, materialism takes two distinct forms: a more 
‘cosmological’ claim about the ultimate nature of the world, and a more specific claim about 
how what is mental is in fact cerebral: how mental processes are brain processes. Now, both of 
these seem to indicate a privileged relation between materialism and scientific inquiry – a 
privileged role for scientific inquiry.  
An amusing, mostly unknown linguistic residue testifies to the close relation between 
materialism and the sciences. Prior to becoming a philosophical term in the later seventeenth 
century with More, Cudworth, and Leibniz, the word ‘materialist’ originally referred to 
pharmacists, who prepared the materia medica: the traveller Pierre Belon noted in 1553 that “Les 
drogueurs ou matérialistes qui vendent ordinairement les drogues par les villes de Turquie, sont 
pour la plupart hommes Juifs.”5 Indeed, from materialists as druggists to the ‘identity theorists’ 
of brain and mind in the 1960s (whose name came from psychophysics), and the subsequent 
doxa of materialism as the handmaiden of neuroscience, the question of which science is in play 
is always relevant. 
In the twentieth century, the predominant science in the vision of a privileged relation 
between materialism and scientific inquiry was physics. Materialism became synonymous with 
‘physicalism’: the entities that were considered to be real were those described in the physics of 
the time. But what about the status of brains, including within a physicalist scheme? An uneasy 
alliance then appears: is the materialist a brain theorist or a metaphysician bringing the rest of the 
world into line with physics? As David Lewis noted in his defense of the IT, “a confidence in the 
explanatory adequacy of physics is a vital part, but not the whole, of any full-blooded 
materialism. It is the empirical foundation on which materialism builds its superstructure of 
ontological and cosmological doctrines, among them the identity theory.”6 In fact, it has been 
observed that much of the identity theory – in its blend of logic, semantics and physicalism – 
conspicuously left out the messy details of neuroscience altogether.
7
 
My topic is not physicalism but rather the second species of materialism, claims about 
minds and brains, within which I distinguish more active, ‘plastic’ visions of the brain from more 
‘passive’ visions, the former being open to an integration of brain and culture, science and our 
‘fiction-making’ capacity. Denis Diderot was one of the first thinkers to notice that any self-
respecting materialist had to address the question of what brains do, and how much of our 
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mental, affective, intellectual life is contained therein. This is not simply the prototypical 
materialist attribution of thought to the brain, which occurs fifty-sixty years earlier in John 
Toland (“Whatever be the Principle of Thinking in Animals, yet it cannot be perform’d but by 
the means of the Brain”; thought is a property of the brain8), and Anthony Collins (consciousness 
is “a real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the Subject itself, the Brain, as Modes of Motion 
do in some Bodies, and Roundness does in others”9). But neither Toland nor Collins feel 
compelled to provide more neuroanatomic detail or speculation; implicitly, this is not part of the 
responsibility of the philosopher as they see it.
10
  
In contrast, what is unique in Diderot may not be flagrant, after a generation of models of 
‘neural complexity’, ‘uncertain systems’ and ‘self-organization’ (some of which even credit 
Diderot, as Gerald Edelman does, for his ‘network’ concepts of brain and nervous system11): the 
recognition that the brain presents a special explanatory and ontological challenge to the 
materialist, in a way that atoms, trees or polyps do not. This recognition leads Diderot to 
formulate a new kind of materialism, in which the nervous system in particular and network 
models in general, such as the harpsichord, play a constitutive role.
12
 
After this the topic grew stale – more elegantly, “the nineteenth-century nervous system 
was less dynamic”13 – with repeated, knee-jerk reiterations of ‘psychophysical identity’ by 
‘vulgar materialists’ such as Ludwig Büchner and Carl Vogt, who obsessively asserted that 
knowledge of the nervous system fully explains mental life, most famously in Vogt’s crude 
formulation, “thought is to the brain what bile is to the liver or urine to the kidneys.”14 Here, 
scientific practice is collapsed into materialism as an ideology. In the 1950s-1960s, a group of 
primarily Australian philosophers, U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart, and D.M. Armstrong (with 
contributions from Herbert Feigl and David Lewis), took up brain-mind materialism afresh, 
under the name ‘identity theory’, in the sense that they were arguing for an identity between 
mental processes and cerebral processes; they actually waver in between being brain theorists 
(with surprisingly little invocation of neuroscientific evidence) and being metaphysicians 
bringing the rest of the world into line with physics. 
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If we contrast Diderot’s materialism with that of the identity theorists, several notable 
features emerge, chiefly that Diderot allows for a much more culturally saturated brain, which he 
describes as a book – “except it is a book which reads itself”; and that he expressed his 
materialism in the form of an experimental philosophical novel, Le Rêve de D’Alembert (1769). 
Rather than just extracting abstract claims from his writings, I note that Diderot presents 
materialism (definitely not just the handmaiden of science then) in a literary or a para-literary 
work, which plays on experimentalism both in science and in style.
15
 I focus on two cases of 
materialism, both of which invoke the brain and the status of cerebral processes, although very 
differently: Diderot and the ‘identity theory of mind’. But some attention to history is called for. 
 
2. Fluidity and spirits 
 
The move from eighteenth-century ‘neurophilosophy’ to twentieth-century philosophy of 
mind may seem a large historical leap, but there is not much philosophical reflection on brains in 
the interim. What then of brains prior to Diderot? Doubtless the most important earlier episode in 
the history of brains is the neuroanatomical work of Thomas Willis, Professor of Natural 
Philosophy at Oxford and a founding member of the Royal Society. 
Willis’s 1664 De cerebri anatome is a fascinating and influential work, articulating an 
experimental program for a bold, unconstrained neuroscience, filled with animal spirits and 
typologies of souls, yet based on comparative anatomy. Despite propelling the brain to the fore, 
however, Willis does not specifically worry about its particular status, or its cultural 
embeddedness. That is, unlike Toland and Collins’s metaphysical assertion of mind-brain 
identity or Locke’s “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind,”16 
Willis opens up neuroanatomy as an unbounded playing field, without committing to any 
dangerous philosophical considerations on matter and mind. However, his emphasis on fluids, 
fermentation, the chemistry of life and the mobility of animal spirits cannot be understated in 
terms of a yet-unwritten history of brain plasticity. Plasticity notoriously is a ‘go-between’ 
concept, spanning experimental neuroscience and social, psychological, linguistic accounts of 
development, and sometimes invoked to stress the brain’s uniquely adaptive character.17 
                                                          
15
 Jean-Claude Bourdin, “Du Rêve de D’Alembert aux Éléments de physiologie. Discours scientifique et discours 
spéculatif dans Le Rêve de D’Alembert,” Recherches sur Diderot et l’Encyclopédie 34 (2003): 45-69; Charles T. 
Wolfe, “Le rêve matérialiste, ou ‘Faire par la pensée ce que la matière fait parfois’,” Philosophiques 34, n° 2 (2007): 
317-328. 
16
 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690, 5
th
 ed. 1701], ed. P. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), I.i.2. For a novel interpretation of empiricism as a contrario suffused with spirits, fancy, 
brain traces and other materialities, see John Sutton, “Carelessness and Inattention: Mind-Wandering and the 
Physiology of Fantasy from Locke to Hume,” in The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied 
Empiricism in Early Modern Science, eds. C.T. Wolfe and O. Gal, 243-263 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010). 
17
 Compare Peter Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity: The Effects of Environment on the Development of the Cerebral 
Cortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002) to Bruce Wexler, Brain and culture: neurobiology, 
ideology, and social change (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006). Work from Atsushi Iriki’s lab shows that 
 5 
A useful distinction, to which I return below, is between more ‘dynamic’ and more 
‘static’ visions of the brain. Willis definitely belongs in the former category, for he envisions the 
brain as a plastic, self-transforming, self-organising entity, while opponents (but also later 
localizationist neuroscientists) see the brain as more of a passive mechanism – a lump of matter 
“of a clammy and unactive Nature and Substance; [which] seems as far as we can judge of it to 
be a meer passive Principle, as to the Acts of inward Sensation and Intellection,” in the words of 
one Boyle Lecturer attacking Willis,
18
 or a mere “Cake of Sewet or Bowl of Curds,” unfit to 
perform our cognitive operations, in Henry More’s words.19 Robert Boyle seems to be directly 
responding to More when he declares that “there must be in the brain . . . far more of mechanism 
than is obvious to a vulgar eye, or even to that of a dissector”; this “seemingly rude lump of soft 
matter” which looks almost like “so much custard” in fact has “strange things performed in it, . . 
. partly by the animal spirits it produces…”20 A vision of brain privileging transmission, 
dynamism, fluidity, and motion, or even just allowing for “more of mechanism in it,” is rather 
different from a “clammy nature,” a “cake of sewet” or a mere “rude lump of soft matter.” For 
after all, 
like Aphrodite, animal spirits would not be among those hypothetical entities which 
meekly hang around waiting to be observed. Making sense of the bits of the world which 
move might require a certain shimmying. Just as in late twentieth-century sciences 
‘nothing is less static than the nervous system’, so the baroque internal edifices of the 
early modern neurophysiology of spirits were maintained only by motion.
21
 
And while a more positivistic history of science would not find a lot of material in the next 
hundred years of proto-neuroscience (aside from imaginative constructs such as Hartley’s 
‘vibratory neuropsychology’ and Albrecht von Haller’s experimental study of the nervous 
system), these “baroque internal edifices” bear various fruit. Initially, the focus on animal spirits 
as explanatory of cognitive processes and thus behavior generates various embodied, clandestine 
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appropriations of neuroscience.
22
 Subsequently, this over-determination of the plasticity of spirits 
leads to an emphasis on the cultural plasticity of neurology itself: “like the modern nervous 
systems it sought to describe, neurology proved itself to be particularly susceptible to absorbing 
the impressions, sensations and contaminations of the broader cultural discourses in which it was 
immersed.”23 
If we combine this gradual recognition of a cultural sedimentation of nervous systems 
with the fascination with nerves as explanatory of various disorders, we get what G.S. Rousseau 
called a new ‘neuromania’ in the eighteenth century: “in some qualified senses … much of the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment was one magisterial footnote on nervous physiology, a 
remarkable attempt to secularize cognition and perception through the brain and its vassal 
nerves.”24 An intriguing case of this neuromania, and a central one here, is Diderot. 
 
3. ‘The brain is a book which reads itself’: Diderot and plasticity 
 
Just as the present essay is not an exercise in the socio-cultural history of brains, 
similarly, it does not focus on the cultural embeddedness of ‘neuromania’ (including spirits, 
brains, nerves, fibres), however fascinating that might be. I accept that brains are culturally 
sedimented; permeated in their material architecture by our culture, history and social 
organization, and that this sedimentation is reflected in cortical architecture, as first seen by the 
Soviet neuropsychologist Lev Vygotsky in the early twentieth century. Vygotsky emphasized the 
brain’s embeddedness in the social world, arguing that early social interaction leads to synaptic 
modifications. As his collaborator Luria put it, “Social history ties the knots that produce new 
correlations between certain zones of the cerebral cortex.”25 In today’s language, “Our minds and 
brains are (potentially) subject to constant change and alteration caused by our ordinary 
developmental engagement with cultural practices and the material world.”26 This is materialism 
sensu stricto, as it is a description of the properties of brains. Similarly, in the case of Diderot, 
we have someone who is not only fascinated with literary incarnations of the spirits (like 
Sterne’s Tristram Shandy) but is also engaged in natural-philosophical reflection on bodies, 
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organs, nerves and brains – one is tempted to say ‘scientific’ reflection but the very name for this 
part of Diderot’s œuvre, is a problematic issue. 
Diderot’s reflection on the activity of brains and minds spans a variety of publications, 
some of which we would regard as novels, others as scientific commentary, and others as plain 
‘philosophy’. The question of genres in his work is an old favourite, also as regards the relation 
between literature and science. Key texts here are his 1749 Lettre sur les aveugles and his 1769 
‘dialogue’ Le Rêve de D’Alembert, both of which seamlessly combine scientific speculation and 
literary experimentation. For present purposes, however, most relevant in addition to the Rêve is 
his Éléments de physiologie, which he worked on during the last two decades of his life, and did 
not publish.
27
 I shall first discuss the Rêve before turning to the Éléments, which contains the key 
statement on the brain as a book. 
Le Rêve de D’Alembert was one of Diderot’s personal favourites amongst his works, and 
remained unpublished during his lifetime; he gave one copy to Catherine the Great as a gift. It is 
divided into three dialogues, all of which feature real individuals as fictional characters. The 
first, between Diderot and D’Alembert, covers traditional philosophical issues such as self and 
world, matter and thought, and God. The second and main dialogue involves the somnolent 
D’Alembert, the doctor Bordeu, and Mlle de Lespinasse. It is based on the conceit of a delirious 
D’Alembert, raving in his sleep (in fact letting dream-associations do the argumentative work for 
him as he accepts what he denied in the first dialogue), so that his companion, Mlle de 
Lespinasse, grows alarmed and summons the doctor to whom she reports D’Alembert’s 
utterances. The rhetorical ingenuity is that D’Alembert has essentially uttered a series of rather 
concise materialist pronouncements, which Bordeu proceeds to explicate, carrying the reasoning 
much further, including in various science-fiction-like thought experiments. Mlle de Lespinasse 
is somewhat shocked at some of these, primarily on moral grounds, but gradually begins, in 
Socratic fashion, to ask increasingly pointed questions. The third dialogue is shorter again, and 
involves only Bordeu and Mlle de Lespinasse, reprising certain issues from the second dialogue, 
including biological and social aspects of monsters, and our material and sexual nature. 
The Rêve articulates a network model of sensibility and a metaphysics of living, sensing 
matter to buttress it. Sensibility (sensibilité, a.k.a. ‘sensitivity’28) is the property of the network, 
which is described through a series of metaphors – a bee-swarm, a harpsichord, a spider… and in 
the Éléments, a crawfish: 
the entire nervous system resides in the medullary substance of the brain, the cerebellum, 
the extended spinal cord, and the ramifications of this substance throughout various parts 
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of the body. It is a crawfish [spider], the nerves of which are the legs, and which is 
affected in various ways according to the leg.
29
 
The bee-swarm is more a metaphor of organismic unity (our organs compose a whole organism 
like bees compose a swarm); the harpsichord is a step closer to our key metaphor of the book: 
This organic faculty, by internally connecting the sounds within it, produces and 
preserves the melody therein. Suppose that the harpsichord has the power to feel and to 
remember, and tell me if it will not know and repeat of its own accord the airs that you 
have played on its keys. We are instruments endowed with sensibility and memory; our 
senses are so many keys that are struck by surrounding nature, and that often strike 
themselves…30  
This emphasis on sensibility should also be understood as underscoring how organisms are not 
like the passive recording mechanisms which fascinated earlier natural philosophers: as Diderot 
exclaims, “What a difference there is, between a sensing, living watch and a golden, iron, silver 
or copper watch!”31 Notably, “our key characteristics lie in our brains, not in our external 
constitution (organisation)” so that “in order to explain the mechanism of memory we have to 
examine the soft substance of the brain.”32 Memory is a product of our organisation (a term that 
here means our overall physiological configuration): “What is memory? . . . A certain [kind of] 
organisation which grows, weakens and sometimes is entirely lost,” “a corporeal quality,” an 
“organic faculty,” the aggregate of all the sensations I have experienced.33 This makes for a 
different kind of materialism, but so far, it does not seem that unusual: we are different from 
other material arrangements of particles because our key characteristics reside in our brains, 
which themselves are the locus of cognitive processes. What is different is Diderot’s central 
choice of metaphor for the brain, in the Éléments: 
In order to explain the mechanism of memory we have to treat the soft substance of the 
brain as a mass of sensitive and living wax, which can take on all sorts of shapes, losing 
none of those it received, and ceaselessly receiving new ones which it retains. There is 
the book. But where is the reader? The reader is the book itself. For it is a sensing, living, 
speaking book, which communicates by means of sounds and gestures the order of its 
sensations; and how does it read itself? By sensing what it is, and displaying it by means 
of sounds.
34
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Diderot may be influenced here by the mysterious, heterodox Benedictine monk Léger-Marie 
Deschamps – they met several times in 1769, when Diderot was writing the Rêve, and 
Deschamps shared with Diderot his ‘clandestine’ materialist treatise, La Vérité ou le vrai 
Système.
35
 Deschamps wrote, “to read me, to hear me read is to become composed of my work, 
which then acts physically by the eyes or ears on the fibres of the brain, and raises them to a 
given tone, according to its impressions on them.”36 
In fact, Diderot seems to move between different positions concerning the brain, at 
different times: either our key characteristics are located in our brain, or the brain is just “an 
organ like any other,” “a secondary organ” (467), “merely a secretory organ” (353); this 
wavering on whether the brain is ‘special’ or ‘an organ like any other’ occurs within the 
Éléments itself. It is likely that these shifting attitudes toward the ontological status of the brain 
map onto Diderot’s shifting views on whether or not one can defend any degree of 
‘anthropocentrism’ within a naturalistic universe: that is, if the brain is special, it allows for a 
form of naturalism in which humans are unique, and if it is an organ like any other, we find 
ourselves in a more thoroughgoing naturalism – albeit one in which all of matter is, actually or 
potentially, living matter. 
 Similarly, Diderot sees that the concept of sensibility allows him to integrate the reactive, 
representational capacity of mind (the nervous system, the brain as a “book which reads itself”), 
while maintaining a thoroughgoing naturalism: there are no properties which are not properties 
of natural beings subject to causal processes as specified in the natural sciences, although these 
properties may vary: naturalism as physicalism is rather different from Diderot’s reduction to 
matter as the bearer of vital properties. Yet these ‘network’ properties are not properties of 
matter as such. Rather, they belong to a body-brain network (like the spider and spiderweb, 
which Diderot views as forming one organic system), which he describes as “a system of actions 
and reactions.”37  
But Diderot’s claims are not just ‘scientific’, even if there are naturalistic elements in 
both his experimental prose and his physiological ‘notebooks’. One approach views Diderot as a 
proto-Bachelardian poet-metaphysician of the cosmos
38
 (as in the Rêve’s “human polyps on 
Jupiter or Saturn”39), who leaps into associative freedom, beyond the constrained empirical 
studies of scientists like Haller and others. Some describe this speculative dimension, in which 
Diderot’s scientific imagination can reach conceptual ‘places’ that science cannot, as a kind of 
science-fiction, or better, as Anne Vila does, as “a thought experiment on sensibility” – a thought 
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experiment which instantly has material effects and is itself “materialized.”40 The other view, 
which focuses on the Éléments, is to view Diderot as a commentator on scientific studies of 
sensibility who remains at the level of fragments, unable to provide his own scientific theory – at 
best, a (materialist) philosopher accumulating information to support his metaphysics. I prefer 
the more sympathetic and expansive version of this view, which does not strictly demarcate his 
reflections on sensibility, brains, bodies and networks from a genuine, if speculative (vitalist) life 
science. 
Read from this perspective, two key features of Diderot’s cultured-brain materialism 
appear more sharply. 
First, that the inextricable relation between thought experiments and the ‘materialisation’ 
of such acts of the imagination is constitutive of his thought: he speaks of “undertak[ing] by 
means of thought what Nature does sometimes.”41 In an extended materialist universe (albeit one 
in which sensibility is a basic property of matter), imagination and what Diderot calls 
“supposition” play a key role: the extension of materialist ontology. Similarly, when he engages 
with debates on biological generation: Diderot neither dutifully takes notes on experimental 
scientific work, nor wildly speculates on it; he seeks to extend the reach of materialist ontology – 
here, as regards Life. Second, that he would not countenance a straightforward linear explanatory 
scheme in which knowledge of brains is more primary and more exact than knowledge of 
culture. He would not think that a future neuroscience would enable us to ‘explain’ cultural 
forms, as in some current ‘neuroaesthetics’, which tells us that in reading prose, “the line ‘He 
had leathery hands’ has just stimulated your sensory cortex in a way ‘he had rough hands’ can 
never hope to.”42 His way of integrating ‘cultured brain plasticity’ (“the brain is a book which 
reads itself”) with broader imaginative extensions (“human polyps on Jupiter”) is not like 
neuroaesthetics, either in its positivistic incarnation (neuroscience explains art) or in its utopian 
incarnation (creating new circuits in art means creating new circuits in the brain, in Deleuze-
Guattari’s phrase).43 It is less unidirectional and mechanistic than the former, more flexible in its 
explanatory schemes; but it is also less utopian than the latter. In this it partly resembles the 
‘libertine’ and ‘clandestine’ appropriation of scientific discourse as found in the so-called 
Radical Enlightenment.
44
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It is both striking and puzzling that the kind of dynamism on display both in early modern 
discourses of animal spirits and in Diderot’s vision of a self-transforming brain, is absent from 
the birth of experimental neuroscience in the nineteenth century. As Sutton politely notes, the 
nervous system here was less dynamic.
45
 But it is significant here, for it is a further attempt – and 
a novel one – to correlate cognitive function with bundles of “spatially structured living 
matter,”46 under the heading of localization. Most visible in this project is the ‘pseudo-science’ 
of phrenology, along with various assertions of psycho-physical or psycho-physiological identity 
– which belong more to a militant rhetoric of science than to the messy reality of empirical 
research. It is a very different kind of identity, or at least a different kind of identity claim, than 
that of the Australian materialists discussed below. 
 
4. From the material organ of the mind to blotches on the wall: identity quarrels 
 
The localization of mental functions in parts of the brain has been described as the closest 
meeting-point of experimental natural science and core issues of human nature, including the 
mind-body problem.
47
 More precisely, by the nineteenth century “most physiologists, physicians, 
and naturalists would [largely] agree that, whatever the function embodied and instantiated by 
some organ, the activity of this bodily part resided … in the portion of living matter by which it 
was subserved,”48 as in Ewald Hering’s 1870 address, “Memory as a general function of 
organised matter.”49 Yet the one ‘site’ where the correlation of bundles of matter and functional 
properties was not clear was the brain. 
Franz Joseph Gall (1739-1828) sought to correlate detailed anatomical descriptions of the 
brain with morphological features of the skull, and with observations on the physical,  
measurable, nature of our mental and moral faculties – what he called ‘organology’ and his 
colleague Johann Spurzheim more enduringly termed ‘phrenology’ (a term Gall rejected).50 Each 
mental faculty possessed its ‘organ’, the development of which could be analyzed by examining 
the external features of the skull. For Gall, the brain was the material organ of the mind, 
composed of a definite number of compartments, each of which is the seat of an intellectual 
faculty or sentiment. Each mental function corresponded to a part of the cortex: the features of 
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the mind were determined by the configuration of the brain.
51
 The mind is seen as “a set of 
functions instantiated by spatially circumscribed and mutually connected portions of neural 
matter.”52 
Despite its somewhat nefarious ideological dimensions, phrenology and related projects 
are important because they explicitly defend an empirical form of mind-brain materialism, which 
naturalizes or at least partly demystifies ‘the mental’. These are reflections on the material basis 
of cognition, based on the experimental investigations of brains – portions of neural matter. 
Notice that this approach is light-years removed from Diderot’s ‘cultured-brain materialism’, 
which emphasizes plasticity and the socio-cultural embeddedness of the brain; but, like his 
approach and unlike the IT, to which I now turn, it is a straightforward set of empirical claims. 
The identity theory (IT), the project to philosophically articulate the identity between 
cerebral processes and mental processes, is the paradigmatic expression of materialism in 
twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy.
53
 Here, the goal is to resolve or eliminate some 
of the problems that have arisen for philosophy as a result of the ‘mind-body problem’, in at least 
two disparate ways, which hang together, sometimes well, sometimes awkwardly: empirically 
(seeking to apply some of the scientific successes of previous generations to the status of the 
mind) and logically (what does it mean to say that a mental event might be the same as a brain 
event?). Crucially, the status of the brain here differs from Diderot’s “book which reads itself,” 
including with regard to the status of science.  
Smart states a mild version of the ‘scientific’ approach (as we shall see, Place has a 
stronger version, bordering on scientism):  
That everything should be explicable in terms of physics (together of course with 
descriptions of the ways in which the parts are put together – roughly, biology is to 
physics as radio-engineering is to electro-magnetism) except the occurrence of sensations 
seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.
54
 
Indeed, the question of what science the identity theorists found their claims on will be 
significant: is it neurology? molecular biology? physics (which yields the idea of causal 
closure)? This is distinct from the logical aspect of the question: when we say a sensation is a 
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brain process, are there two kinds of things which are related (and what is the nature of the 
relation), or is there only one thing? Of course, these can be unified, as in Armstrong’s 
presentation of the IT as a solution to the mind-body problem, which can account for (1) the 
unity of mind and body, (2) the numerical difference between minds, (3) the interaction of mind 
and body, (4)  the emergence of mind (e.g. in evolutionary terms), and (5) inner states.
55
 But in 
fact the IT (as distinct from later neurophilosophy, which focuses more on points 4 and 5) chiefly 
works on the first three points, in very internalist terms. 
What exactly is happening when I say ‘I see a orange blotch’? Smart’s 1959 article 
begins abruptly: “Suppose that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged after-
image which is yellowish towards its edge and orange towards its center. What is it that I am 
reporting?”56 He later explains that he wants to show “that there are no philosophical arguments 
which compel us to be dualists” (143): if recent science shows that organisms can be understood 
as physico-chemical mechanisms, what about the mind? Smart suggests, cautiously, that we 
should start by rethinking the language we use to describe mental events, such as ‘I am in pain’ 
or ‘I see an orange blotch on the wall’. Our sensation and the corresponding brain-process might 
well refer to the same thing (151), even if the logic of the two statements may be different. 
The IT seeks to strip the ‘mental’ dimension from my report of, say, a sensation of 
orange, so that it becomes ‘There is something going on within me like what happens when a 
certain physical stimulus is present’. However, Smart cannot commit to which physical event the 
mental event is like; it is a contingent identity. That is why the IT is topic-neutral, more of a 
place-holder than a robust materialist account, although he has left room for science to ‘fill in the 
gaps’. Indeed, as “brain-imaging evidence begins to replace the subject’s introspective report in 
determining the occurrence and nature of her conscious experience,” Place feels that the IT 
moves closer to being a genuine, verifiable scientific theory, just as for Feigl, a “detailed account 
of brain-mind identities is a matter of future progress of psychophysiological research.”57 
To Smart, this is partly right and partly wrong. He agrees that the claim ‘sensations are 
brain processes’ can be tested scientifically (recall Vogt’s ‘The brain secretes thought like the 
liver secretes bile’), yet he does not want to make empirical claims, not least because of the 
difficulty of correlating complex, intentional mental states with patterns of neuronal activity: 
“conscious experiences must be processes involving millions of neurons, and so their important 
likenesses and unlikenesses to one another may well be statistical in nature.”58 And statistical 
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correlation is an unlikely basis for identity.
59
 In the end, statistical correlations and contingent 
relations do not sound too boldly materialistic, unlike Diderot’s ontologically assertive 
materialism: he may have thought brains were special, qua ‘books which read themselves’, but 
Diderot was nevertheless willing to make empirical, material claims about living matter as a 
whole, including sensibility, cognition and mental life. 
There is a surprising absence of scientific detail in the IT – of embodiment. There are 
hints of DNA and neurology; but mostly, there is physics: materialism post-1950s is physicalism. 
How does one get from physics to the specific relation between brain states and mental states? 
Armstrong says it is a “good bet”60; in fact it is partly an inductive argument based on the past 
successes of reductionist approaches. As Bickle et al. note, there were various plausible 
candidates for psychoneural identities in scientific literature before the IT: Hebb’s The 
Organization of Behavior (1949) explains psychological phenomena in terms of known neural 
mechanisms and processes. But the IT primarily focuses on the logic of the ‘identity’ between 
sensations and cerebral processes (although as noted, Place differs from Smart on this). The 
contrast with Diderot and other materialists should be apparent: here, there is no strong claim 
that locates mental life in a bundle of (neural, material, sensing) matter. However much Diderot 
employed metaphors, he was speaking about the mode of existence of real brains. To be clear, 
the issue is not how much is known about the brain: writing after Gall and Flourens, Place and 
Smart know, or could refer to, far vaster swathes of neurocircuitry than Diderot or a fortiori 
Collins; but they chose not to. 
Nevertheless, whether in the form of contingent identity claims (Smart) or of explicit 
empirical claims to be filled in by future neurophysiology (Place), the IT is, broadly speaking, 
scientism, i.e. a vision in which materialism is ultimately fatal to philosophy by serving as the 
handmaiden of science: 
[I]t would seem that the long reign of the philosopher as the professional in charge of the 
mind-body problem is finally coming to its end. Just as … the origins of the universe 
used to be a theological problem and is now an astronomical one, so the mind-body 
problem is about to pass from the grasp of the philosopher into that of the 
neuropsychologist.
61
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It should be clear that Diderot’s materialism is not of this sort, notably because of its speculative, 
fictional component. Indeed, materialism does not have to be a ‘handmaiden’ of the natural 
sciences; conversely, science is not necessarily “the laboratory of materialism.”62  
 
5. The brain between scientism and fiction 
Materialisms diverge as they address the status of the brain, between more plastic and 
aesthetically open models (Diderot and others), and more static, quantitative models (including 
phrenology and the IT). The difference is not between a specifically cerebral materialism and 
more disembodied models; Toland and Collins also explicitly identify cerebral processes and 
mental processes, as does nineteenth-century localizationism in more detail (although it is not 
necessarily philosophically materialist) and psychophysics. Diderot is distinctive in recognizing 
a kind of cerebral plasticity and self-organization, and insisting on their irreducibly fictional 
dimension. Is he then the ‘predecessor’ of a more holistic trend running counter to ‘Australian’ 
materialism? This was claimed in once-fashionable works seeking to unify aesthetic complexity 
and physics, like Prigogine and Stengers.
63
 But if we make Diderot into the poster child of an 
‘enchanted materialism’ of fiction and embodiment, we lose sight of his own reductionism. 
However, Diderot (like Vygotsky for whom “History, changing the human type, depends on the 
cortex; the new socialist man will be created through the cortex”64) and some contemporary 
cultured-brain theorists, provides not just a materialist outlook, but one which acknowledges the 
self-organising dimension of brains.  
One might say that Diderot’s is a materialism without physicalism, whereas the IT is a 
materialism without embodiment.
65
 Somehow, for reasons that are partly intuitive and affective 
(embodiment implies affectivity), it is embodied materialism that recognizes the ‘plasticity’ of 
the book which reads itself, in contrast to the older view of the brain as merely passive. Unlike 
the “clammy and unactive Substance,” the “meer passive Principle,”66 Diderot’s more plastic 
vision of the brain is neither passive nor mechanistic. Cultured-brain materialism is thus not a 
‘scientism’ or a denial of the symbolic and valuative dimensions of life, contrary to the criticisms 
launched recently by David Hawkes – which are almost identical to the charges brought in a 
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1933 article by Raymond Ruyer, tellingly entitled “What is living and what is dead in 
materialism.”67 
Ruyer suggests a thought-experiment: imagine a law court as seen through the eyes of a 
materialist. “The halo of meanings, essences and values” vanishes, and what is left is the 
“functioning of a sort of complicated mechanics” whereby brains produce articulations, which in 
turn generate vibrations in the air, and thereby modify other nervous systems.
68
 For Ruyer 
materialism is a strange kind of reductionism which denies the reality of social institutions, 
values, and of course minds. Hawkes’ similar vision has been nicely challenged by John Sutton 
and Lynn Tribble. They note (without any particular focus on the status of brains) that 
materialism need not claim that ‘only matter exists’, but is instead “firmly pluralist” in its 
ontologies: “Even if all the things that exist supervene on or are realized in matter, the materialist 
can still ascribe full-blown reality to tables and trees and tendons and toenails and tangos and 
tendencies”; an account including the brain need not exclude “memories, affects, beliefs, 
imaginings, dreams, decisions, and the whole array of psychological phenomena of interest to 
literary, cultural, and historical theorists.”69  
The materialism of the ‘cultured brain’ is very much of this sort: it integrates the brain 
and the affects, cerebral architecture and our aptitude to produce fictions. But it is not enough to 
rebut these ‘antelapsarian’ visions of a cold, dead materialism seizing living value, sentiment and 
meaning in its embrace and reducing them to piles of “clammy” matter (sewet, curds, etc.). For 
from the opposite side of the spectrum, some ‘neuroaesthetic’ thinkers claim to integrate 
materialism, brain science and art, but in the flattest way: “I picture a future for writing that 
dispenses with mystery wherever it can, that embraces the astounding strides in thought-organ 
research. Ideally, a future where neuroimaging both miniaturises and becomes widespread, 
augmenting the craft of authors, critics, agents and publishing houses.”70 
Despite its potential scientism, the IT is not as caricaturally restrictive as this; it can 
indeed consider that our knowledge of mental life is filled in by the progress of neuroscience 
(Bickle), or instead become a “heuristic identity theory.”71 Either of these can preserve 
narrativity as a supervenient feature, in which selfhood emerges out of stories my brain ‘tells 
itself’: a “narrative self”72 in which “consciousness is a property I have by virtue of my brain’s 
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attributing it to me. My story doesn’t have to cohere completely to be useful.”73 Of course, this 
narrativity is a far cry from Diderot’s way of preserving a role for fiction within materialism. 
How is this role preserved? The embodied character of Diderot’s materialism means that 
the brain has particular properties distinct from physical nature as a whole. It is a brain 
embedded in culture, expressed in works where experimentalism is both ‘science’, literature and 
metaphysics. Does the cultured-brain materialist have to grant special ontological status to the 
brain? Clearly, for the IT, the brain does not have an ontology; there is physics, and anything 
above, including biology and neuroscience, is like special kinds of radio engineering. In contrast, 
for Diderot, it does. But how can materialism maintain that the brain has an ontology without 
reintroducing ‘kingdoms within kingdoms’ (as Spinoza described the erroneous belief that 
human nature is apart from the laws of nature as a whole)? If we over-ontologise the brain in 
order to not be mystical dualists or knee-jerk anti-scientists, we may also run the risk of 
reconfiguring humanity as just “a cerebral crystallization.”74 
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